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Abstract
A key issue in monetary policy is that on the importance of fol-
lowing systematic behaviours. The paper revisits the classic debate
on rules versus discretion focusing on the design of instrument rules
in a manner that push discretionary policy choices in the direction
of the commitment equilibrium. It is shown that an instrument rule
with an optimal degree of monetary inertia may render negligible the
in‡ationary bias associated with discretion without necessarily imply-
ing a trade-o¤ between ‡exibility and commitment. The rationale
for this surprising …nding is found in the disciplining e¤ect played by
interest-rate smoothing on the incentive to create surprise in‡ation by
reducing suddenly the interest rate within the time horizon of existing
nominal contracts. If the degree of gradualism is high it may enhance
the credibility of optimal monetary policy as it contrasts the incentive
to fool private sector.
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11 Introduction
Real world central bankers do not seem to believe in the desirability of ty-
ing their hands by …xing policy choices according to a given formula for
setting the instrument. Blinder (1998), speaking at the same time as a prac-
titioner and as an academic, expresses clearly this view when he writes: ”the
real world cure to the alleged ”in‡ation bias” problem did not come from
adopting rigid precommitment (”rules”) or other institutional changes, as
Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon suggested. It came from determined
but discretionary application of tight money.” However, despite of this re-
luctance to commit to follow …xed rules, there exists strong empirical evi-
dence supporting the existence of a rule-like behaviour by central banks in
the setting of interest rates.
Barro and Gordon viewed the time inconsistency explanation of the in‡a-
tionary bias as an argument for rules over discretion, along Friedman lines.1
With the policy maker committed to a …xed monetary policy rule it is not
possible to create surprise in‡ation and the problem of dynamic inconsistency
disappears.
But there is an important distinction from Friedman’s case for a constant
growth rate of money, who believed that the presence of long and variable
lags between adjustments to monetary policy instruments and their real ef-
fects on the economy implies potentially destabilising impacts of an active
monetary policy. Actually, the Barro and Gordon argument for a monetary
policy rule can be also maintained in a framework where there is room for
an activist feedback monetary policy rule. If we allow for the presence of in-
formation asymmetry between policy maker and private sector regarding the
realisations of supply shocks, then the equilibrium policy rule in the commit-
ment regime involves a potential role for an active monetary policy, o¤setting
shocks and therefore helping to stabilise in‡ation and output.
However, as observed by Alesina (1988), Persson and Tabellini (1990) and
Lohmann (1992), in this Barro-Gordon framework extended to incorporate
supply shocks the ex-ante optimal monetary policy rule is contingent on the
state of the world. Unfortunately, in practice policy makers cannot easily
commit to a state-contingent monetary policy rule. If, instead of a state
contingent rule, a simple rule is pursued (e.g. a Friedman type rule), then
1Barro and Gordon (1983) wrote in the abstract of their celebrated paper: ”The value
of these commitments - which amount to long-term contracts between the government and
the private sector - underlies the argument for rules over discretion.”
2it will dominate a discretionary rule only if output shocks are small and
rare. In unstable periods there is more scope for stabilisation policies and a
discretionary behaviour is preferable.
The idea that there is a trade-o¤ between the bene…ts ofavoidingthe in‡a-
tionary bias of discretionary policy and the potential costs of being bound to
follow a monetary rule that is no longer appropriate has led some economists
to …nd some compromises. Flood and Isard (1989) have proposed, for in-
stance, the formulation of simple rules with explicit escape clauses. They
argue that society might improve on the outcomes achieved under a discre-
tionary regime, by motivating the central bank to follow a hybrid policy:
in normal times the central bank follows a simple rule, while it responds to
unusual circumstances at its discretion.
Some other economists increasingly have viewed rules not as constraints
imposed on central banks externally, but as time-consistent means of oper-
ating internally - for example, as explicit starting points for consideration
of current policy option. So in that sense there need not necessarily be a
trade-o¤ between ‡exibility and commitment. Recent e¤orts in this direc-
tion are those of Feldstein and Stock (1994), Hall and Mankiw (1994), and
McCallum (1994). They have proposed alternative monetary rules to be con-
sidered by central banks whose policies are not strictly limited by exchange
rate commitments. In particular McCallum formulates a more sophisticated
monetary feedback rule, which takes account of changes in the velocity of cir-
culation. He proposes a rule that sets the growth rate of money base at 3 per
cent annum, with adjustments for the change in base velocity over the past
four years and also for the deviation of nominal GNP from a de…ned steady
nonin‡ationary path. This rule, which treats nominal GNP as the target
variable and the monetary base as the instrument, is shown to produce good
in‡ation and output performance in several small econometric models. In the
context of …xed rules, the McCallum type can provide a useful compromise
with ‡exibility.
An alternative view on the argument is provided by Taylor (1993). Ac-
cording to him the rules versus discretion dilemma is rather a semantic issue,
in the sense that in practice a policy rule can be de…ned more generally as
a systematic behaviour. Hence there is no need to follow mechanically an
algebraic formula. Moreover, as Taylor argues: ”with this broader de…nition
of policy rules, comparing the performance of di¤erent rules becomes more
challenging”.
In his celebrated article he formulates the so called Taylor rule: a repre-
3sentative interest rate rule that captures relatively well the Fed’s behaviour
during the 1987-1992 period. In order to make operational this rule, which
obviously is not practical to follow in a rigid way, he considers two possibil-
ities. One is to include the speci…c formula in the list of key elements that
form the basis for monetary policy decisions. A second is that of making use
of general characteristics of the given rule without referring explicitly to the
algebraic formula for the central bank’s decision-making process.
McCallum (1993), in answering to Taylor’s proposal of broadening the
de…nition of policy rules beyond a speci…c formula, shows that the presence
or absence of systematic behaviour is not su¢cient for separating between
discretion and a behaviour based on an rule. What is also required is that
”the policy authority [::::] must also design the systematic response pattern
to take account of the private sector’s expectational behaviour”. By mak-
ing use of the analytical distinction between commitment and discretion on
which is based the time-inconsistency literature he shows that also under a
discretionary regime the policy maker may follow a systematic behaviour. In
particular he expresses the policy maker problem in terms of choosing the
parameter values of a given formula. Nevertheless the presence of this sys-
tematic behaviour under a discretionary regime does not prevent the economy
from the arising of an in‡ationary bias.
In the present paper we will focus on the criticism of McCallum to Tay-
lor’s de…nitional issue and explore the importance of adopting systematic
behaviours in the setting of monetary instruments. Contrary to McCallum’s
…nding, we show that optimally designed instrument rules may render neg-
ligible the in‡ationary bias associated with time consistent monetary policy
without prejudice to stabilisation of shocks. Furthermore, our framework
sheds also some light on the puzzling issue of the inertial behaviour followed
by central bankers in the setting of interest rates, i.e. the practice of interest-
rate smoothing.
The order of the exposition is the following. Section 2 provides an analyt-
ical distinction between instrument rules and target rules. Section 3 discusses
the empirical evidence on interest rate rules. Section 4 illustrates the model.
Section 5 considers the simple case of no interest-rate smoothing and repli-
cates McCallum’s …nding. The case of sluggish adjustments of the interest
rate is examined in section 6. Here are exposed the most innovative results
of the analysis. Section 7 concludes.
42 Instrument rules versus target rules
In our analysis we will focus our attention on instrument rules and in partic-
ular on interest rate rules. Thus a …rst step should be to de…ne formally an
instrument rule. To the aim of de…ning rigorously what are instrument rules
it might be useful …rst to compare them with an alternative kind of rules:
target rules.
Svensson (1996) proposes the following distinction: ”Setting the instru-
ment to make the in‡ation forecast equal to the in‡ation target is an example
of a target rule which, if applied by the monetary authority, would result in an
endogenous optimal reaction function expressing the instrument as a function
of the available relevant information. This is di¤erent from an instrument
rule that directly speci…es the reaction function for the instrument in terms
of the current information.”
This dichotomy is not generally accepted. McCallum (1997), for exam-
ple, argues that the distinction between instrument rules and target rules is
merely theoretical. Judging from a practical perspective, the importance of a
target rule that is not expressed in terms of a feasible instrument variable is
debatable. Consequently, he proposes the following de…nition: ”a monetary
policy rule is a formula that speci…es instrument settings, with the choice of
a target variable and path constituting only one ingredient”.
In the time-inconsistency literature there is a standard formalisation of
instrument rules and target rules. Instrument rules are identi…ed with a
…xed formula that speci…es the decision rule of the policy maker and are
interpreted in terms of the analytical distinction between commitment to a
rule and discretion. The de…nition of target rules is found instead within the
normative side of the literature, rather than in the positive one.
Rogo¤’s (1985) is considered the pioneer of strategic delegation in mon-
etary policy. The proposal of changing monetary institutions for dealing
with the issue of time inconsistency and the alleged in‡ationary bias is the
core idea behind the approach of monetary delegation. Recently the dele-
gation approach has been extended by the work of Walsh (1995), Persson
and Tabellini (1993) and Svensson (1997) among others, with the introduc-
tion of incentive schemes or policy targets in order to completely remove the
in‡ationary bias. As pointed out by Rogo¤ the optimality of delegation of
monetary policy to a ”weight-conservative” central banker suggests also an
alternative interpretation of the delegation process. In particular he shows
that this kind of solution to the in‡ationary bias problem can be interpreted
5also as an in‡ation targeting scheme based on punishments and rewards.
Similar considerations have been made on Walsh contracting solution too.
For example, Persson and Tabellini (1997) have stressed the close relation-
ship between in‡ation targeting schemes and contracts based on penalties
conditional on realised in‡ation.2 Also Svensson’s ”target-conservative” cen-
tral banker can be indirectly related to an in‡ation targeting scheme as it is
possible to show that an optimal in‡ation target is equivalent to an optimal
linear in‡ation contract.
Other types of target rules have been considered by Rogo¤: monetary
targeting, interest-rate targeting, etc.. But in all the cases considered the
target rule has been modelled by including in the central bank’s objective
function some weight on achieving the speci…ed target.
In the following sections we will consider a general de…nition of an instru-
ment rule for the interest rate which yields some interesting insights on the
role that can be played by instrument rules in monetary policy.
3 The empirical evidence on interest rate rules
Despite of the great importance of the interest rate as a policy instrument
only recently the empirical and theoretical literature has focused on interest
rate rules.3 The path breaking work of Taylor (1993) started the debate.4
There has been a large body of literature describing the macroeconomic
implications of interest-rate smoothing, which assumes the presence of an
interest-rate smoothing or alternatively an interest-rate targeting objective
in the loss function of the policy maker.5 However, in this line of research
interest-rate smoothing is not related to an explicit rule for setting interest
rates.
2See also Walsh (1997) for a broader discussion on in‡ation targeting regimes.
3In the words of Blinder (1998): ”Returning to Poole’s dichotomy [on the choice of mon-
etary instrument]...in the end, real-world events, not theory, decided the issue. Ferocious
instabilities in estimated LM curves in the United States, United Kingdom, and many
other countries, beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present day, led economists
and policymakers alike to conclude that money-supply targeting is simply not a viable
option....So interest rates won by default”.
4See Taylor (1999) for a recent state-of-the-art appraisal of the fundamental issues
facing central banks with a particular focus on monetary policy rules.
5Reviews on this literature are provided by Cukierman (1992), Goodhart (1996), Walsh
(1998), Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999), Sack and Wieland (1999).
6The empirical evidence on the interest rate rule followed by central banks
in the last two decades can be summarised by the following form
rt = °rt¡1 + (1 ¡ °) ¹ rt; (1)
with
¹ rt = Â0r
¤ + Â1(¼t ¡ ¼
¤) + Â2(yt ¡ y
¤); (2)
where 0 < ° < 1; rt is the nominal interest rate and the variable ¹ rt is an
operative target given by expression (2). In this speci…cation the operative
target is a function of both in‡ation ¼t and output yt expressed as deviations
from trend levels; r¤ is trend nominal interest rate and Â0;Â1;Â2 are positive
parameters. This policy rule implies that the interest rate reacts to in‡ation
and output gap but there is only partial adjustment to these variables due to
the presence of an interest-rate smoothing component. The common feature
of all estimates of the degree of inertia in the central bank’s response, °, is
that they are large and highly signi…cant, normally on the order of .8 or .9.6
Using the words of Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999): ”The existing the-
ory, by and large, does not readily account for why the central bank should
adjust rates in such a sluggish fashion. Indeed, understanding why central
banks choose a smooth path of interest rates than theory would predict is an
important unresolved issue”.
One important exception is constituted by Woodford (1998). He provides
a rationale for a central banker with an interest-rate smoothing objective in
terms of an optimal monetary delegation problem. Among other relevant
contributions, his model provides also a New Keynesian perspective of the
issue of time inconsistency.7 However his analysis is based on two crucial
assumptions. He postulates that in the social loss there is an interest-rate
targeting motive and that there exists a central banker that prefers for in-
terest rate to deviate farther from its target. In this latter case, as observed
by Woodford, the interest rate target can hardly be interpreted as a target.
These assumptions are needed to show that it can be advantageous for soci-
ety to delegate monetary policy to a central banker who includes in his loss
function an interest-rate smoothing objective.
6See the review in Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999). Sack (1998) estimates for ° a value
of 0.63, with a standard error of 0.08. Higher values are found by Orphanides (1998) and
Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998a,b).
7See also Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999) for a similar attempt.
7Unfortunately these assumptions seem quite ad hoc. As we will see later
on, our analysis provides also an alternative view on the inertia observed
in the response by central banks to changes in macroeconomic variables,
without using the restrictive assumptions considered by Woodford.
4 The model
The analysis is based on a stochastic rational expectations IS-LM model.
Aggregate supply is given by a standard expectations augmented Phillips
curve
yt = yn + ®(¼t ¡ ¼
e
t) + vt; (3)
where yt is the level of output, ¼t the in‡ation rate and vt is a random
disturbance normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾2
v: Private
sector’s in‡ation expectations, ¼e
t; are formed rationally. The parameter ® is
positive.
Aggregate demand is given by
yt = yn ¡ ¯ (rt ¡ ¼
e
t ¡ ½) + ut; (4)
where rt is the nominal interest rate, ½ is the long-run equilibrium real in-
terest rate and ut is a stochastic disturbance normally distributed with mean
zero and variance ¾2
u . The stochastic disturbances ut and vt are assumed to
be independent of each other. The parameter ¯ is positive.8
By equating (3) and (4), after some manipulations we can obtain an
expression for in‡ation as a function of the nominal interest rate, in‡ation
expectations and exogenous variables
¼t =
¯
®
½ +
® + ¯
®
¼
e
t ¡
¯
®
rt ¡
1
®
vt +
1
®
ut: (5)
This equation can be expressed also in terms of interest rate expectations
in the following way. After taking expectations of (5) we get
¼
e
t = r
e
t ¡ ½: (6)
Substitution of (6) in (5) implies
8The speci…cation of the aggregate demand with current period in‡ation expectations
has been used also by Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999).
8¼t = ¡½ +
® + ¯
®
r
e
t ¡
¯
®
rt ¡
1
®
vt +
1
®
ut; (7)
consequently the aggregate demand equation can be rewritten as
yt = yn ¡ ¯ (rt ¡ r
e
t) + ut: (8)
Turning to preferences, as usual it is assumed that the government’s pref-
erences coincide with those of society. The preferences are represented by
the government’s loss function
V = E0
1 X
t=1
±
t¡1Lt; (9)
where ±, with 0 < ± < 1, is the discount factor and the government’s
period loss function Lt is given by
Lt = ¼
2
t + ¸(yt ¡ y)
2; (10)
where the parameter ¸ is a relative weight. In order to introduce the issue
of time inconsistency it is assumed that the government wishes to increase
output above the natural level, with y > yn.
Monetary policy is delegated to a central banker whose preferences are
given by:
V
b = E0
1 X
t=1
±
t¡1Lt; (11)
where it is assumed that the central banker’s period loss function is iden-
tical to expression (10).
Last but not least, an important novel element of our model concerns the
way monetary policy is implemented. The interest rate is the instrument
used by the monetary authority for achieving its goals. In the following
analysis we will consider e¢cient instrument rules for setting the nominal
interest rate. The general speci…cation of these instrument rules will be
rt = °b rt¡1 + (1 ¡ °)rt; (12)
¹ rt = a + b¹ r
e
t + cb rt¡1 + mvt + nut; (13)
9b rt = a + b¹ r
e
t + cb rt¡1; (14)
where the interest rate level chosen by the central banker is expressed as a
convex combination of two components, with 0 < ° < 1. One is a targeting
component in the sense that the variable rt is an operative target which
expresses the level of the interest rate in terms of a speci…ed formula. The
other is a partial adjustment component, with the interest rate rt dependent
upon the past values of b rt.
This general speci…cation for an interest rate rule is consistent with the
empirical evidence on interest-rate smoothing, as expressed by (1). But in
contrast with the speci…cations usually considered in empirical and theoret-
ical literature it is based only on a component of the lagged interest rate.
Actually, as we can see from the de…nition of b rt, the inertial term is referred
only to the systematic component of the operative target rt while stochastic
shocks are excluded. Thus according to (12) current policy decisions depend
also on past decisions but only on those referred to the systematic component
of the operative target.
The rule adopted in the analysis re‡ects the recurrent use of operating
targets for the interest rates controlled by central banks. However, a typical
speci…cation for the operating target would be to express rt in terms of the
current level of in‡ation and a proxy for real activity, as in equation (2). Here
we consider an alternative speci…cation for rt; which takes account of all the
relevant state variables present in the model. The term ¹ re
t in expressions (13)
and (14) represents private sector’s expectations on the operative target: If
we add in the framework also some persistence in in‡ation and output, then
the speci…cation of rt would resemble more closely the speci…cations of rt
examined in empirical analysis.9
If the degree of monetary inertia is zero, that is ° = 0; and b rt¡1 is elim-
inated from (13) we get an expression which is analogous to that examined
by McCallum (1993) for discussing the importance of the presence of a sys-
tematic behaviour in order to distinguish between rule-like and discretionary
behaviour. He supposes that the policy maker’s optimisation problem con-
sists in choosing the parameters a;b,m and n.10
9See Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999) for a similar consideration in a framework
where in‡ation persistence is explicitly introduced in the analysis.
10McCallum (1993) does not consider explicitly shocks in his policy rule but the line of
reasoning is the same: the systematic procedure followed in the implementation of policy
10This operating procedure is an institutional feature of monetary policy
and is common knowledge among all the players of the policy game examined.
Moreover, this procedure is operative under both discretion and commitment.
Of course the optimal parameter values may change according to the given
monetary regime under which the central banker operates. However, it bears
repeating that the policy rule operates despite the fact that the policy regime
is discretionary. As suggested by McCallum, the presence of this policy rules
simply re‡ects the idea that the policy maker adopts a systematic behaviour
in setting the monetary instrument.
The question he poses is whether the presence ofthis systematic behaviour
under a discretionary regime may imply outcomes that are distinct from the
case where this systematic behaviour is absent and, in particular, if these
outcomes are the same as those pertaining to a regime with commitment.
We investigate the same question but with the introduction of an additional
element concerning the speci…cation of the policy rule examined by McCal-
lum. In particular we consider the possibility that the policy maker adopts
also a systematic inertial behaviour in choosing the level of the interest rate.
As we have seen the presence of monetary inertia in central banks be-
haviour is empirically well documented. We assume that the inertial compo-
nent in the policy rule is constituted only by the systematic component of
the operative target rt: The rationale for this restriction is rather intuitive:
smoothing interest rate in proportion to rt¡1 or rt¡1 would a¤ect the stabili-
sation of shocks in a suboptimal way, while the time-inconsistency problem
we are seeking to tackle is related only to the systematic component of the
policy rule.
So we suppose that monetary authorities act gradually with a certain
degree of monetary inertia for some reasons. Candidate reasons that have
been adduced in the literature are several: forward-looking behaviour by
private agents, measurement errors associated with macroeconomic variables,
uncertainty about structural parameters, concern for the …nancial stability
of the banking system, adverse reactions of …nancial markets to frequent
modi…cations in the direction of short-term interest rates.11
In contrastto the standard approach for modellingan interest-rate smooth-
ing motive, we do not include in the central bank’s loss function an objective
consists in choosing optimally the value of the parameters which relates macroeconomic
variables to the level of the control variable.
11For a recent review see for example Sack and Wieland (1999).
11of minimising the deviations of current level of interest rate from previous
period levels, as done for instance by Woodford (1998). We postulate in-
stead that this interest-rate smoothing motive is explicitly incorporated in
the policy rule adopted by the central bank.
How plausible is this alternative formalisation? Sack (1998) for instance
says that: ”many empirical studies of monetary policy incorporate an ex-
plicit interest-rate smoothing incentive in the objective function of the Fed.
However, introducing this argument has little justi…cation beyond matching
the data. Furthermore, the above statistics provide evidence of gradualism
only if the Fed would otherwise choose a random-walk policy in absence of
an interest-rate smoothing objective. Therefore, while establishing that the
funds rate is not a random walk, these statistics do not necessarily provide
evidence of gradualism in monetary policy.”12 Moreover Sack and Wieland
(1999) o¤er several arguments, discussing the empirical evidence supporting
them, that explain why central banks may have an incentive to smooth in-
terest rates without assuming an interest-rate smoothing objective in their
loss function.
We interpret interest-rate smoothing as a feature of the implementation
of monetary policy in practice and not as an object in the policy maker’s
loss function. While gradualism is a stylised fact, on the contrary there is
no evidence of central bank’s having as goal or as intermediate target the
minimisation of the deviations of current level of interest rate from previous
period levels. Moreover the motive for smoothing interest rate should be
modelled explicitly in the loss function and not by simply inserting the by-
product of the desired main goal.13
Hence, in the present framework we assume that central bank’s behaviour
is characterised by some degree of monetary inertia, de…ning ° between zero
and one, and that this stylised fact is incorporated in the policy rule followed.
A crucial assumption is that the systematic behaviour followed by the policy
12The issue whether interest-rate smoothing is the result of the presence of an addi-
tional objective in the policy maker’s loss function or alternatively is a by-product of the
particular characterisation of the structure of the economy (which implies some partial
adjustment mechanism) is an open debate. In order to have a clearer understanding on
this issue further empirical evidence is needed. An interesting empirical contribution is
that of Favero and Rovelli (1999) who propose an approach which allows to identify the pa-
rameters that pertain to the policy maker’s preferences independently from those relative
to the structure of the economy.
13For instance see Cukierman (1992) for an attempt in the direction of including a
…nancial stability motive directly in the central bank’s loss function.
12maker and embodied in the policy rule (12) is generally understood by the
public.
Moreover we assume also that the policy maker can choose ex-ante the
speci…c value of ° (within the de…ned range) in order to stabilise in‡ation
and output optimally. This means that the presence of inertia is introduced
exogenously and justi…ed by the above arguments, but the degree of grad-
ualism in the adjustment of the interest rate is chosen endogenously by the
central banker. In particular we assume that the parameter ° represents and
additional institutional feature of the systematic operating procedure chosen
ex-ante for setting the interest rate.
It is possible to observe that the described process for setting the mon-
etary instrument resembles the case when the monetary authority does not
control perfectly the instrument. For instance Cukierman and Meltzer (1986),
Letterie (1997) and Swank (1994) assume that the volatility of multiplicative
control errors is an institutional feature of the implementation of monetary
policy that can be chosen ex-ante optimally. However conservatism in the use
of the monetary instrument (as implied by Brainard’s uncertainty) does not
necessarily mean gradualism (as implied by a partial adjustment process).
In the following sections we will suppose that the implementation of mon-
etary policy follows three stages. In the …rst stage, the government delegates
monetary policy to a central banker and instructs him to follow an assigned
instrument rule, given by (12). In other words the choice made by govern-
ment consists to direct the central banker to follow a systematic behaviour
in the setting of interest rates. In the second stage, the central banker makes
the ex-ante choice of °, that is he chooses the degree of monetary inertia
introduced in the economy. In the third stage, the parameter values in rt are
derived from the optimisation problem of the central banker. Of course the
stages become two in the case of no interest rate-smoothing.
5 No interest-rate smoothing
5.1 Commitment
In order to replicate McCallum’s results, we start …rst with the case when the
monetary authority does not change smoothly the interest rate, i.e. ° = 0 in
the instrument rule (12). In this case we have that the interest rate is given
by
13rt = ¹ rt: (15)
In our framework, due to the presence of an instrument rule of the type
of (12), the actual choice variable of the monetary authority is ¹ rt: Hence the
relevant expectations are those that the private sector forms on ¹ rt. From
(15) we have
r
e
t = ¹ r
e
t: (16)
Following Svensson (1997) and Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999), in
the commitment solution the central banker internalises in his minimisation
problem the impact of his decisions on the interest rate on private sector’s ex-
pectations. So let’s formalise the optimization problem of the central banker
when he is able to commit in advance to a decision rule for the choice variable
¹ rt. We have:
min
¹ rt;¹ re
t
E0
1 X
t=1
±
t¡1Lt; (17)
s.t. Eqs. (7);(8);(10);(15);(16) and ¹ r
e
t = Et¡1[¹ rt];
which is equivalent to solve the static problem of minimising the expected
period loss function
min
¹ rt;¹ re
t
Et¡1Lt; (18)
s.t. Eqs. (7);(8);(10);(15);(16) and ¹ r
e
t = Et¡1[¹ rt]:
Di¤erentiating Lt with respect to ¹ rt and ¹ re
t we get the following …rst order
conditions
¡2
¯
®
¼t ¡ 2¸¯ (yt ¡ y) + -t¡1 = 0;
Et¡1
"
2
® + ¯
®
¼t + 2¸¯ (yt ¡ y) ¡ -t¡1
#
= 0; (19)
where -t¡1 is the Lagrange multiplier of ¹ re
t = Et¡1[¹ rt]. Eliminating the
multiplier yields
14¡2
¯
®
¼t ¡ 2¸¯ (yt ¡ y) + 2
® + ¯
®
Et¡1¼t + 2¸¯ (Et¡1yt ¡ y) = 0:
(20)
Now, we can postulate the following reaction function for the central
banker:
¹ rt = a + b¹ r
e
t + mvt + nut; (21)
where there is no lagged variable.
Substitution of (21) in (20) implies that for optimality we must have
following values for the coe¢cients of the decision rule (21)
a =
½®2
(1 + ¸®2)¯
2;
b =
(1 + ¸®2)¯
2 ¡ ®2
(1 + ¸®2)¯
2 ;
m = ¡
1
(1 + ¸®2)¯
;
n =
1
¯
: (22)
The private sector’s expectations are found by taking expectations at t¡1
over the reaction function of the central banker, which gives
¹ r
e;c
t = ½: (23)
Substituting the private sector’s expectation in the central banker’s reac-
tion function gives the equilibrium value of ¹ rt under a regime with commit-
ment
¹ r
c
t = ½ ¡
1
(1 + ¸®2)¯
vt +
1
¯
ut: (24)
Inserting (24) in (15) gives the equilibrium value of the interest rate rc
t.
While substitution of the equilibrium values for ¹ rc
t and ¹ r
e;c
t back in equation
(7) and (8) gives the equilibrium values of in‡ation and output:
¼
c
t = ¡
®¸
1 + ¸®2vt; (25)
15y
c
t = yn +
1
1 + ¸®2vt: (26)
>From (15) and using (24), it is possible to see that average nominal
interest rate is equal to the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, ½. While
from (25) we can see that under a regime with commitment average in‡ation
is equal to zero.
5.2 Discretion
Now consider the optimization problem of the central banker when he chooses
¹ rt in a discretionary manner. In this case the coe¢cients in ¹ rt are chosen pe-
riod by period, rather than once and for all, and private sector’s expectations
are no longer a control variable. Here the policy maker solves the following
problem
Et¡1min
¹ rt Lt; (27)
s.t. Eqs. (7);(8);(10);(15);(16);
where, as observed by Persson and Tabellini (1998), it is possible to con-
clude that the expectations operator becomes redundant.
Di¤erentiating Lt with respect to ¹ rt we get the following …rst order con-
dition
¡2
¯
®
¼t ¡ 2¸¯ (yt ¡ y) = 0: (28)
Again, we assume that the central banker’s reaction function is repre-
sented by (21). This yields the following optimal values for the coe¢cients
of the decision rule considered
a = ¡
®[½ + ®¸(y ¡ yn)]
(1 + ¸®2)¯
;
b =
(1 + ¸®2)¯ + ®
(1 + ¸®2)¯
;
m = ¡
1
(1 + ¸®2)¯
;
16n =
1
¯
: (29)
Comparing the optimality conditions (29) with those correspondent to
the case of commitment, we can observe that now a is negative instead of
positive, while in the numerator of b the term (¯ ¡ ®) is disappeared. The
private sector’s expectations are found by taking expectations at t ¡ 1 over
the reaction function of the central banker, which gives
¹ r
e;d
t = ½ + ®¸(y ¡ yn): (30)
Repeating all the substitutions made in the case of commitment we can
get the following equilibrium values for the case of discretion
¹ r
d
t = ½ + ®¸(y ¡ yn) ¡
1
(1 + ¸®2)¯
vt +
1
¯
ut; (31)
Inserting (31) in (15) gives the equilibrium value of the interest rate rd
t.
While substitution of the equilibrium values for ¹ rd
t and ¹ r
e;d
t back in equation
(7) and (8) gives the equilibrium values of in‡ation and output:
¼
d
t = ®¸(y ¡ yn) ¡
®¸
1 + ¸®2vt; (32)
y
d
t = yn +
1
1 + ¸®2vt: (33)
>From (15) and using (31), it is possible to see that average nominal
interest rate is higher than in the case of commitment, as it is equal to
[½ + ®¸(y ¡ yn)]. While from (32) we can derive the famous result that under
a regime with discretion average in‡ation is characterised by an in‡ationary
bias, equal to [®¸(y ¡ yn)]. Thus, as observed by McCallum, the presence
or absence of systematic behaviour is not enough to distinguish between
rule-like behaviour and discretion, as the presence of a systematic behaviour
under a discretionary regime does not remove the in‡ationary bias.
6 Interest-rate smoothing
6.1 Commitment
Let’s consider the case of interest-rate smoothing. Consider again …rst a
regime where a commitment strategy is available to the central banker. In
17this case the instrument rule we will consider for the interest rate is (12).
Expression (12) implies that private sector’s expectations on the interest
rate are given by
i
e
t = °b rt¡1 + (1 ¡ °) ¹ r
e
t: (34)
The optimization problem of the central banker when he is able to commit
in advance to a decision rule for the choice variable ¹ rt can be expressed as
min
¹ rt;¹ re
t
E0
1 X
t=1
±
t¡1Lt; (35)
s.t. Eqs. (7);(8);(10);(12);(34) and ¹ r
e
t = Et¡1[¹ rt]:
This is now a dynamic programming problem with two control variables,
¹ rt and ¹ re
t; and one state variable, the lagged variable b rt¡1. As shown by Lock-
wood and Philippopoulus (1994) and Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1994) and
(1998), the solution can be obtained by solving the following equation with
the value function V (b rt¡1):
V (b rt¡1) = min
¹ rt;¹ re
t
Et¡1
h
L
b
t + ±V (b rt)
i
; (36)
s.t. Eqs. (7);(8);(10);(12);(34) and ¹ r
e
t = Et¡1[¹ rt]:
As we have a linear-quadratic problem, V (b rt) must also be quadratic.
Without loss of generality, we can set
V (b rt) = µ0 + 2µ1b rt + µ2b r
2
t: (37)
Now using the fact that b rt = ¹ rt ¡ (mvt + nut;), we have
V¹ r (b rt) = 2(µ1 + µ2b rt): (38)
Di¤erentiating V (b rt¡1) with respect to ¹ rt and ¹ re
t we get the following …rst
order conditions
18¡2
¯
®
(1 ¡ °)¼t ¡ 2¸¯ (1 ¡ °)(yt ¡ y) + 2±µ1 + 2±µ2b rt + -t¡1 = 0;
Et¡1
"
2(1 ¡ °)
® + ¯
®
¼t + 2¸¯ (1 ¡ °)(yt ¡ y) ¡ -t¡1
#
= 0;
(39)
where -t¡1 is the Lagrange multiplier of ¹ re
t = Et¡1[¹ rt]. Eliminating the
multiplier yields
0 = ¡2
¯
®
(1 ¡ °)¼t ¡ 2¸¯ (1 ¡ °)(yt ¡ y) + 2±µ1 + 2±µ2b rt
+2(1 ¡ °)
® + ¯
®
Et¡1¼t + 2¸¯ (1 ¡ °)(Et¡1yt ¡ y): (40)
Here we have a dynamic framework. Thus in order to …nd the optimal
reaction function for the central banker we postulate a decision rule like
expression (13).
Substitution of (13) in (40) implies that for optimality we must have
following values for the coe¢cients of the decision rule (13)
a =
®2[½(1 ¡ °) ¡ ±µ1]
(1 + ¸®2)¯
2(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2®2;
b =
(1 ¡ °)
2 ³
¯
2 ¡ ®2 + ¸¯
2®2
´
(1 + ¸®2)¯
2(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2®2;
c = ¡
®2° (1 ¡ °)
(1 + ¸®2)¯
2(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2®2;
m = ¡
1
(1 ¡ °)(1 + ¸®2)¯
;
n =
1
(1 ¡ °)¯
: (41)
The private sector’s expectations are found by taking expectations at t¡1
over the reaction function of the central banker:
¹ r
e;c
t =
½(1 ¡ °) ¡ ±µ1
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
¡
° (1 ¡ °)
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
b rt¡1: (42)
19Substituting the private sector’s expectations in the central banker’s re-
action function gives the equilibrium value of ¹ rt under a regime with com-
mitment:
¹ r
c
t =
½(1 ¡ °) ¡ ±µ1
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
¡
° (1 ¡ °)
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
b rt¡1 ¡
1
(1 ¡ °)(1 + ¸®2)¯
vt +
1
(1 ¡ °)¯
ut:
(43)
Inserting (43) in (12) gives the equilibrium value of the interest rate rc
t.
While substitution of the equilibrium values for ¹ rc
t and ¹ r
e;c
t back in equation
(7) and (8) gives the equilibrium values of in‡ation and output:
¼
c
t = ¡
±[½µ2 + (1 ¡ °)µ1]
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
+
°±µ2
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
b rt¡1 ¡
¸®
1 + ¸®2vt;
(44)
y
c
t = yn +
1
1 + ¸®2vt: (45)
>From (44) emerges an important di¤erence with respect to the static
case, without interest-rate smoothing. We can observe from the equilibrium
value of in‡ation that interest-rate smoothing allows the policy maker to
smooth in‡ation over a number of periods.
Following Svensson (1997), in order to …nd µ1 and µ2 we can apply the
envelope theorem on (36), which combined with (38) implies
V¹ r (b rt¡1) = 2(µ1 + µ2b rt¡1) = Et¡1[2° (¼t)]; (46)
or
2(µ1 + µ2b rt¡1) = ¡2±
(
° [µ1(1 ¡ °) + ½µ2]
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
¡
°2µ2
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
b rt¡1
)
:
(47)
Identi…cation of µ1 and µ2 gives
20µ1 = ¡
±µ2°½
(1 ¡ °)±° + (1 ¡ °)
2 + ±µ2
; (48)
µ2 = 0; (49)
µ2 =
±°2 ¡ (1 ¡ °)
2
±
: (50)
If µ2 = 0, then also µ1 = 0 and the value function (37) becomes equal to
a constant. Hence in the case of µ2 = 0 the optimization problem is not any
more a dynamic programming problem but is reduced to a static one-period
issue. In this case the monetary authority cannot use the interest rate to
smooth in‡ation over a number of periods. The same consideration can be
made for the second value of µ2 when ° has the following values
°1 =
1 ¡
p
±
1 ¡ ±
; (51)
and
°2 =
1 +
p
±
1 ¡ ±
; (52)
where the value °2 given by (52) can be excluded by de…nition as, for
0 < ± < 1, it is greater than one. Thus it cannot be a possible value of
°, being it de…ned as 0 < ° < 1. Let’s see how we can select the relevant
solution.
For convenience we focus the analysis on the parameters of the decision
rule given by ¹ rt. Without loss of generality, we can write the expression of
the equilibrium value of ¹ rt as
¹ rt = Á0 + Á1b rt¡1 + Á2vt + Á3ut: (53)
Using (43), it is possible to see that the values of µ2 given by (49) and
(50) imply respectively the following values for the coe¢cient of b rt¡1
Á1 = ¡
°
1 ¡ °
; (54)
and
Á1 = ¡
1 ¡ °
±°
: (55)
21In order to eliminate one of these solutions we can consider the argu-
ment used by Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994), Svensson (1997), Clark,
Goodhart and Huang (1999). They recommend to choose the smaller solu-
tion as the relevant one. This is based on the fact that the smaller solution
has the nice property to be stable, in the sense that when a small disequi-
librium deviation is introduced the system returns to the equilibrium value
of Á1 under a revision rule which is consistent with the recursive nature of
the optimization problem. Now, it is possible to see that when ° > °1 the
solution (55) is lower in absolute value than that expressed by (54) and the
opposite occurs when ° < °1. Moreover, if ° > [1=(1 + ±)] > °1, the solution
(55) will be less than one in absolute value; the same occurs for the solution
(54) when ° < :5. In the appendix A it is shown what is in our framework
the revision rule that can be used for analysing the stability requirement.
In the following sections we will consider the solution (55) as the relevant
one, assuming for the moment that the central banker chooses ex-ante a
degree of monetary inertia included between the range [1=(1 + ±)] < ° < 1.
Substitution of (48) and (50) in expressions (43), (44) and (45) yields
¹ r
c
t =
[(1 ¡ °) + ±°]
°±
½ ¡
(1 ¡ °)
°±
b rt¡1 ¡
1
(1 ¡ °)(1 + ¸®2)¯
vt +
1
(1 ¡ °)¯
ut;
(56)
¼
c
t = ¡
h
±°2 ¡ (1 ¡ °)
2i
°±
½ +
h
±°2 ¡ (1 ¡ °)
2i
°±
b rt¡1 ¡
¸®
1 + ¸®2vt;
(57)
and
y
c
t = yn +
1
1 + ¸®2vt: (58)
Here it is possible to see that average in‡ation and interest rate under
a commitment regime with interest-rate smoothing are the same as under a
commitment regime without monetary inertia, that is
E [¼
c
t] = 0;
E [r
c
t] = ½: (59)
22The derivation of these results is found in appendix B. Moreover, from
the comparison with the analogous expressions for the case of commitment
without interest-rate smoothing, it is possible to observe that stabilisation of
shocks is still optimal. So smoothing interest rate, with a degree of inertia
° chosen ex-ante in the interval [1=(1 + ±)] < ° < 1, is still optimal under a
commitment regime.
6.2 Discretion
The optimization problem of the central banker when a commitment tech-
nology is not available can be formalised as
V (b rt¡1) = Et¡1min
¹ rt [Lt + ±V (b rt)]; (60)
s.t. Eqs. (7);(8);(10);(12);(34) .
Di¤erentiating V (b rt¡1) with respect to ¹ rt we get the following …rst order
condition
¡2
¯
®
(1 ¡ °)¼t ¡ 2¸¯ (1 ¡ °)(yt ¡ y) + 2±µ1 + 2±µ2b rt = 0: (61)
Substitution of the postulated reaction function (13) in (61) implies that
for optimality we must have following values for the coe¢cients of the decision
rule (13)
a = ¡
¯®(1 ¡ °)[®¸(y ¡ yn) + ½] + ±µ1®2
¯
2(1 ¡ °)
2(1 + ¸®2) + ±µ2®2 ;
b =
¯ (1 ¡ °)
2(¸¯®2 + ¯ + ®)
¯
2(1 ¡ °)
2(1 + ¸®2) + ±µ2®2;
c =
¯°®(1 ¡ °)
¯
2(1 ¡ °)
2(1 + ¸®2) + ±µ2®2;
m = ¡
1
(1 ¡ °)(1 + ¸®2)¯
;
n =
1
(1 ¡ °)¯
: (62)
23The private sector’s expectations are found by taking expectations at t¡1
over the reaction function of the central banker:
¹ r
e;d
t = ¡
¯ (1 ¡ °)[®¸(y ¡ yn) + ½] + ®±µ1
®±µ2 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 +
¯° (1 ¡ °)
®±µ2 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 b rt¡1:
(63)
Following the same substitutions made previously for the case of commit-
ment we can get the equilibrium values of ¹ rt, in‡ation and output:
¹ r
d
t = ¡
¯ (1 ¡ °)[®¸(y ¡ yn) + ½] + ®±µ1
®±µ2 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 +
¯° (1 ¡ °)
®±µ2 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 b rt¡1
¡
1
(1 ¡ °)(1 + ¸®2)¯
vt +
1
(1 ¡ °)¯
ut; (64)
¼
d
t = ¡
®± [½µ2 + (1 ¡ °)µ1] + ¸®¯ (1 ¡ °)
2(y ¡ yn)
®±µ2 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 +
°®±µ2
®±µ2 ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 b rt¡1
¡
®¸
1 + ¸®2vt; (65)
y
d
t = yn +
1
1 + ¸®2vt: (66)
>From (65), we can conclude that also here interest-rate smoothing allows
the policy maker to smooth in‡ation over a number of periods.
In order to …nd µ1 and µ2 we can apply the envelope theorem on (60)
which combined with (38) implies
V¹ r (b rt¡1) = 2(µ1 + µ2b rt¡1) =
2°
h
±µ2®2 + ¯
2(1 ¡ °)
2i
®
h
±µ2® ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2i¼t + 2¸°
¯
2(1 ¡ °)
2
±µ2® ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 (yt ¡ y);
(67)
identi…cation of µ1 and µ2 gives
24µ1 = ¡
°±µ2
n
¯ (1 ¡ °)
2[¯½ + ®¸(¯ + ®)(y ¡ yn)] + ½±µ2®2
o
®±µ2(1 ¡ °)(±®° + 2°¯ ¡ 2¯) + ¯
2(1 ¡ °)
3(1 ¡ ° + ±°) + ®2±
2µ
2
2
;
(68)
µ2 = 0; (69)
µ2 =
±°2® + 2¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 + °
r
±
h
±°2®2 + 4¯ (1 ¡ °)
2(¯ + ®)
i
2±®
; (70)
µ2 =
±°2® + 2¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 ¡ °
r
±
h
±°2®2 + 4¯ (1 ¡ °)
2(¯ + ®)
i
2±®
: (71)
Here again the case of µ2 = 0 implies µ1 = 0 and thus the value function
(37) becomes a constant. Using the general expression (53) of the equilibrium
value of ¹ rt and the coe¢cient values in (64), the values of µ2 given by (69),
(70) and (71) imply respectively the following values for the coe¢cient of the
lagged b rt
Á1 = ¡
°
1 ¡ °
; (72)
and
Á1 = ¡
p
±®° ¡
q
±°2®2 + 4¯ (1 ¡ °)
2(® + ¯)
2
p
± (® + ¯)(1 ¡ °)
; (73)
and
Á1 = ¡
p
±®° +
q
±°2®2 + 4¯ (1 ¡ °)
2(® + ¯)
2
p
± (® + ¯)(1 ¡ °)
: (74)
It is easy to see that the value of Á1 given by (73) is in absolute value
always smaller than that implied by (74). Hence the choice is between the
values given by (72) and (73).
As before, the …rst of these values implies that in the instrument rule (12)
the lagged b rt disappears. Now it is straightforward to show using l’Hopital’s
Rule that
lim
°!1
0
@¡
p
±®° ¡
q
±°2®2 + 4¯ (1 ¡ °)
2(® + ¯)
2
p
± (® + ¯)(1 ¡ °)
1
A = 0: (75)
25Hence it is always possible to …nd a value of ° that makes the solution (73)
smaller than that expressed by (72), as this latter solution becomes greater
than one in absolute value for ° > :5:
Substituting (68) and (70) in equations (64), (65) and (66) allows to
…nd the equilibrium values of in‡ation, output and interest rate. In gen-
eral average in‡ation will not be zero. However, an interesting property of
interest-rate smoothing emerges if we take the limit of average in‡ation for
° ! 1. It is possible to see that we have in this case
lim
°!1
h
E¼
d
t
i
= 0: (76)
To understand why we have this e¤ect on steady state in‡ation as ° ! 1
it is useful to consider also the limit of average interest rate. It is possible to
show that we have
lim
°!1E
h
r
d
t
i
= ½: (77)
As ° ! 1 average interest rate tends to the level of average interest
rate prevailing under a commitment regime without monetary inertia. The
intuition for this striking e¤ect of monetary inertia can be found from the …rst
order condition, by ignoring for simplicity stochastic shocks. From expression
(61) it is possible to see that as ° ! 1 the systematic component of the
optimal policy rule is actually found by minimising the value function (37),
as the trade-o¤ between the marginal bene…t of higher surprise in‡ation and
the marginal cost of higher in‡ation becomes less important as the degree of
inertia increases. In the steady state, if ° is close to 1, the optimal level of the
interest rate will be equal to the lowest possible level, which in the present
rational expectations IS-LM model is given by the long-run equilibrium real
interest rate. This implies that the presence of a very high degree of monetary
inertia under discretion is equivalent to committing toachieving a low average
nominal interest rate in order to obtaining low average in‡ation.
These results are derived in greater detail in the appendix B. Moreover
from the comparison of (65) and (66) with the analogous equilibrium reac-
tion function for the case of discretion without interest-rate smoothing it is
possible to observe that stabilisation of shocks is still optimal.
Hence, if the degree of monetary inertia is su¢ciently high, the in‡ation-
ary bias associated to time consistent monetary policy becomes negligible
without implying the arising of a trade-o¤ between credibility and ‡exibility.
26The rationale for this striking result is found in the contrasting e¤ect played
by interest-rate smoothing on the incentive to create surprise in‡ation by
reducing suddenly interest rates within the time horizon of existing nominal
contracts.
7 Conclusion
The present analysis has re-examined the debate on rules versus discretion
and, in particular, the commitment versus ‡exibility dilemma that is asso-
ciated with the adoption of policy rules. In the literature instrument rules
are opposed to discretion and commonly identi…ed with a …xed algebraic for-
mula to which are ex-ante mechanically tied the choices of the policy maker.
However there is no need to interpret instrument rules more restrictively
than target rules, which are usually formalised as a constraint limiting dis-
cretionary choices.
In our framework the policy maker may follow an explicit instrument
rule also under a discretionary regime, where discretion is understood as a
situation where the policy maker’s optimisation is done for each period after
observing shocks. We interpret instrument rules as a systematic behaviour
followed by the policy maker in the setting of the instrument. In particular
the policy maker optimisation problem consists in choosing some parameters
of a speci…ed instrument rule that relates macroeconomic variables to the
level of the instrument.
The de…nition of instrument rules used is in logical agreement with Tay-
lor’s alternative view on the rules versus discretion debate. He observes that
in practice a policy rule can be de…ned more broadly as a systematic be-
haviour and there is no need to follow mechanically an algebraic formula.
This intuition of Taylor is questioned by McCallum’s by using the Barro-
Gordon framework. He shows that an in‡ationary bias will still emerge un-
der a discretionary regime even if monetary authorities follow a systematic
behaviour in the setting of the instrument. Hence the presence or absence
of a systematic pattern in the choice of the instrument is not su¢cient for
separating discretionary behaviour from rule-like behaviour.
Contrary to McCallum, we show that it may be advantageous for society
to delegate monetary policy to a central banker following a systematic be-
haviour in the setting of the monetary instrument. We express the systematic
pattern in the implementation of policy in terms of an optimally designed
27instrument rule for setting the interest rate. The crucial feature of the instru-
ment rule examined is the presence of a certain degree of monetary inertia.
It is postulated that monetary authorities smooth interest rates by means of
a partial adjustment mechanism where past decisions constitute an impor-
tant determinant of the current level of the interest rate. If the process of
implementation of monetary policy is transparent and generally understood
by the public, the adoption of the speci…ed instrument rule may render neg-
ligible the in‡ationary bias associated with a discretionary regime, without
necessarily introducing a trade-o¤ between commitment and ‡exibility. It is
shown that this favourable circumstance is associated with the presence of a
su¢ciently high degree of monetary inertia introduced institutionally ex-ante
by the policy maker.
Our analysis is based on the idea, re‡ected in the empirical evidence on
actual policy making, that central banker’s current decisions on the interest
rate are a function of both past decisions and current information. A crucial
assumption for obtaining our result is that the policy maker’s inertial be-
haviour is systematic and common knowledge among all players. Hence the
present analysis can be interpreted as an argument for transparency of the
process of policy decisions.
Monitoring the process of implementation of policy can be relatively eas-
ier than monitoring policy choices and central bank’s external communication
may play an important role in reducing the uncertainty on the way mone-
tary policy is conducted. Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996) have shown that,
unless we take the simple non-stochastic model considered in much of the
early literature, the public may face a severe signal extraction problem when
monitoring the policy maker’s action. On the contrary, if gradualism is an
institutional feature of the implementation of policy, then what is actually
needed for making credible monetary policy is making explicit the systematic
process underlying policy decisions. In that perspective following systematic
behaviours simpli…es private sector’s process of central bank watching.
It bears underlying that in our framework private sector’s conditional
expectations of in‡ation may diverge from the socially optimal rate even
when monetary policy is said credible, where credibility is understood as low
and stable unconditional expectation of in‡ation. Moreover, Barro-Gordon’s
result of the superiority of rules over discretion holds also in our framework,
but it is reinforced as the superiority of rules is demonstrated also within a
regime where a commitment technology is not available.
The …nding that with interest-rate smoothing optimal monetary policy
28can be more credible than in the case without monetary inertia is new in
the literature. As observed, for example, by Walsh (1998): ”Central banks
have often been criticized, however, for smoothing interest rates. During the
late 1960s and 1970s, the Fed’s attempts to prevent interest rates from rising
in the face of increasing in‡ation served to exacerbate subsequent in‡ation.
Thus, an understanding of the consequences of interest-rate smoothing is
important”.
In the present analysis we provide a theoretical support for the optimal-
ity of interest-rate smoothing. The intuition for the surprising result that
gradualism enhances credibility can be found in the view, expressed by the
time-inconsistency literature, that the main problem of monetary policy is
the excessive activism of central bankers seeking to exploit employment and
output gains deriving from in‡ation surprises. In this perspective gradualism
can be optimal as it contrasts the incentive to fool private sector.
Our analysis provides an explanation of why real world central banks
may deliberately choose to move their short-term interest rates in sequence
of small steps in the same direction and that reversals in its direction are
relatively infrequent. In particular our formalisation is capable of rational-
ising the very slow adjustment of interest rates in practice, which cannot
be attributed to systematic policy responses to persistency in the evolution
of output or in‡ation. As we observed, if monetary authorities inertial be-
haviour is systematic, acting is such a sluggish fashion may reinforce the
credibility of monetary policy. The crucial determinant for this positive out-
come is the transparency of the systematic process of implementation of
policy, in the sense that the public must understand the speci…c systematic
behaviour followed by the policy maker.
The analysis could be extended in a number of ways. Allowing for errors in
the control of the instrument, for forward-looking behaviour by the private
sector and for some persistence in in‡ation or unemployment would add
greater realism. It would be of interest to explore whether in these cases it
would be possible to derive an optimal policy rule with the same features of
the popular rule examined by Taylor. However, the mentioned extensions are
likely to add the complexity of the analysis without a¤ecting the result that
regimes based on instrument rules aimed at monetary stability may represent
an alternative to regimes based on target rules.
Our …nding has interesting policy implications. The well established in-
ternational empirical evidence on instrument rules may suggest that from
the point of view of implementation following instrument rules, that is sys-
29tematic behaviours, is likely to be more feasible than the adoption of the
other solutions proposed in the literature for eliminating the in‡ationary
bias. In the real world only New Zealand’s monetary regime is closest to the
kind of delegation formalised by the contracting approach. While Svensson’s
”target-conservative” central banker has been criticised as been unrealistic,
as in practice the countries that have adopted an in‡ation targeting regime
do not seem to set their in‡ation targets below the socially optimal level
of in‡ation rate. Moreover, Rogo¤’s ”weight-conservative” central banker,
apart from not being supported by the empirical evidence on central banks
independence, has also been questioned for its real feasibility. In practice the
government might …nd it di¢cult to appoint a central banker with exactly
the right degree of conservatism.
30Appendix A
In this appendix we provide the revision rule used in chapter 4for analysing
the stability of the multiple solutions described in the text. In particular here
we follow the approach of Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999).14
First we consider the general form for the equilibrium decision rule of rt
rt = Á0 + Á1rt¡1 + Á2vt + Á3ut: (A.1)
>From (A.1) we have
r
e
t = Á0 + Á1rt¡1: (A.2)
Now substituting both equations in Et¡1V (rt¡1) and using the value func-
tion
Vt¡1(rt¡1) = µ0;t¡1 + 2µ1;t¡1rt¡1 + µ2;t¡1r
2
t¡1; (A.3)
we can derive the general relationship between µ0;t¡1;µ1;t¡1;µ2;t¡1 and
Á0;t;Á1;t;Á2;t;Á3;t. Identi…cation of µ2;t¡1 leads to
µ2;t¡1 =
h
(1 ¡ °)Á1;t + °
i2
1 ¡ ±Á
2
1;t
: (A.4)
This expression is general and holds for both the values of Á1;t obtained
under commitment and discretion. They are given by
Á
c
1;t = ¡
° (1 ¡ °)
(1 ¡ °)
2 + ±bµ2;t
; (A.5)
and
Á
d
1;t = ¡
¯° (1 ¡ °)
¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 ¡ ±bµ2;t®
: (A.6)
Now, by inserting (A.4) in the expressions (A.5) and (A.6) taken at t¡1,
Á1 can be revised by iteration backward as t goes to ¡1.
14They thank in a note Lars Svensson for suggesting them this approach.
31Appendix B
This appendix provides the derivation of the results obtained in chapter
4. Here we derive steady state or unconditional expectation of in‡ation and
nominal interest rate when monetary authorities smooth interest-rates under
both discretion and commitment.
Inserting the expressions
¹ rt = Á0 + Á1b rt¡1 + Á2vt + Á3ut; (B.1)
¹ r
e
t = Á0 + Á1b rt¡1; (B.2)
in the expression of in‡ation given by (4.7), we can write the equation
of in‡ation in terms of the coe¢cients Á of the decision rule in the following
way
¼t = [(1 ¡ °)Á0 ¡ ½] + [° + (1 ¡ °)Á1] b rt¡1 ¡
1 + (1 ¡ °)¯Á2
®
vt
¡
(1 ¡ °)¯Á3 ¡ 1
®
ut: (B.3)
Now recalling that
b rt = Á0 + Á1b rt¡1; (B.4)
we can express b rt as
b rt = Á
t
1b r0 + Á0
t¡1 X
i=0
Á
i
1: (B.5)
Substituting (B.5) in (B.3) allows to compute steady state in‡ation as
E [¼t] =
Á0 ¡ ½(1 ¡ Á1)
1 ¡ Á1
: (B.6)
Now consider …rst the case of commitment. Here we have the following
values
Á0 =
[(1 ¡ °) + ±°]
°±
½; (B.7)
Á1 = ¡
(1 ¡ °)
°±
; (B.8)
32which after substitution in (B.6) imply that
E [¼
c
t] = 0: (B.9)
In order to understand this result it is useful to compute average nom-
inal interest rate. We can see that under commitment with interest-rate
smoothing average interest rate will be equal to average interest rate under
commitment without monetary inertia, that is
E [r
c
t] = °
Ã
Á0
1 ¡ Á1
!
+ (1 ¡ °)
"
Á0 + Á1
Ã
Á0
1 ¡ Á1
!#
= ½:
(B.10)
Now examine the case of discretion. Here the expression of average in‡a-
tion is more complicate as in this case we have
Á0 = ¡
¯ (1 ¡ °)[®¸(y ¡ yn) + ½] + ±µ1®
±µ2® ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2 ; (B.11)
Á1 =
¯° (1 ¡ °)
±µ2® ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ °)
2; (B.12)
where µ1 and µ2 are given respectively by expressions (4.68) and (4.70).
However an important result can be found. Taking the limit of (B.6) for
° ! 1 yields
lim
°!1E
h
¼
d
t
i
= 0: (B.13)
In order to …nd the limit of this complicated expression we have used
Maple c °. However this result can be derived also using the following simpler
limits
lim
°!1µ1 = ¡½; (B.14)
lim
°!1µ2 = 1; (B.15)
lim
°!1Á1 = 0; (B.16)
33lim
°!1Á0 = ½: (B.17)
Also here it is possible to see that as ° tends to one, the steady state
level of interest rate under discretion with interest-rate smoothing tends to
the steady state value of the interest rate under commitment without interest-
rate smoothing, that is
lim
°!1E
h
r
d
t
i
= lim
°!1
(
°
Ã
Á0
1 ¡ Á1
!
+ (1 ¡ °)
"
Á0 + Á1
Ã
Á0
1 ¡ Á1
!#)
= ½:
(B.18)
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